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What Happens When Species Move but
Reserves Do Not? Creating Climate Adaptive
Solutions to Climate Change
Nicholas Whipps*
Most U.S. laws and regulations are not well-suited to respond to the effects of climate
change, and the Endangered Species Act—the central federal law meant to protect
threatened and endangered species at all costs—is no different. Conservation banking,
an Endangered Species Act policy, is a market-based conservation strategy that
incentivizes landowners to conserve species on their land. However, fee simple
conservation strategies are ill-suited to protecting species on the move due to climate
change. This Note first highlights the inadequacies of the current conservation banking
system, then suggests how policy makers can transfer the market-based credit system
used in conservation banking to a more climate-adaptive system that protects species
on the move, which would better meet the goal of the Endangered Species Act to
restore populations of listed species. This market-driven climate-adaptive strategy is a
more effective means of protecting species that will be moving, while also helping to
decrease the traditional conflict between species protection and use of private land.

* Senior Articles Editor, Hastings Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California
Hastings College of the Law. The Author would like to thank Professor David Takacs and the Hastings
Law Journal Notes staff for their invaluable feedback throughout the editing process.
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Introduction
The bighorn sheep is an icon of the southwestern United States.
Adapted to rocky terrain, they have lived in the Sierra Nevada
mountains of California for over three hundred thousand years.1 Bighorn
sheep have survived in the Sierra Nevada through at least three ice ages
and subsequent periods of warming.2 Adept at lithely grappling on
craggy surfaces, it appears as though all species of bighorn sheep are now
facing their largest set of obstacles yet: humans and climate change.3

1. Overview of Sierra Nevada Bighorn Sheep Research Projects, Cal. Dep’t Fish & Game,
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/snbs/ProgramProjects.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (stating that the Sierra
Nevada bighorn sheep’s history “goes back 300–400 thousand years”).
2. Id. (“[B]ighorn sheep have persisted in the Sierra Nevada through at least three ice ages.”).
3. See Christy M. McCain & Sarah R. B. King, Body Size and Activity Times Mediate
Mammalian Responses to Climate Change, Global Change Biology, Jan. 22, 2014, at 1, 9 (“[L]argebodied, obligatory diurnal or nocturnal mammals are rapidly responding to current climate change and
many of these responses indicate higher extinction risks. Most of these mammals are the charismatic
fauna of North America[, including] bighorn sheep . . . .”); see also Bighorn Sheep, U.S. Nat’l Park
Serv., http://www.nps.gov/romo/naturescience/bighorn_sheep.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (“Under
the pressures of disease, hunting, and habitat alteration, the bighorn population declined until the
middle of this century, when research in the 1950’s indicated that about 150 bighorn remained in the
area of Rocky Mountain National Park. The surviving bighorn herds were in areas less accessible to
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After three hundred thousand years, California bighorn sheep, like
their desert and Rocky Mountain relatives, are now facing pressure to
move as a result of climate change.4 Although they can move on almost
any hilly surface, these sheep are not adapted to living on land humans
have altered for their own uses.5 Since humans have altered much of the
western United States to suit their needs, bighorn sheep forced to move
due to climate change pressures will continue to run into modified or
destroyed habitat, which acts as a barrier preventing these sheep from
finding a suitable habitat further north.6
Scientists predict that temperatures in the United States will rise
between four and eleven degrees Fahrenheit by 2100.7 This increase
might be too great for many animals to acclimate, and many animals will

human contact. Their range was limited to the isolated, high country regions . . . . The migrating, lowcountry herds were gone.”); Sarah Jane Keller, In a New Study, Megafauna More Likely to Feel
Climate Impacts than Smaller Species, High Country News (Jan. 27, 2014),
https://www.hcn.org/blogs/
goat/among-north-american-mammals-iconic-ones-are-most-likely-to-feel-impacts-from-climate-change
(“[L]arger animals, like moose or desert bighorn sheep have to migrate on a larger scale, and that’s
often not possible because their habitats are too fragmented. If a herd of desert bighorn sheep tries to
escape drought they are probably going to have to have to cross over vast, inhospitable valleys to do
it.”); Basic Facts About Bighorn Sheep, Defenders of Wildlife, http://www.defenders.org/bighornsheep/basic-facts (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (“While livestock is not as much of a threat as in the past,
loss of habitat from development is an increasing threat.”).
4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5. See Basic Facts About Bighorn Sheep, supra note 3 (“[L]oss of habitat from development is
an increasing threat.”).
6. See Keller, supra note 3 (discussing difficulties larger animals, such as bighorn sheep, face
while traveling through fragmented habitat); see also Peninsular Desert Bighorn Sheep Conservation,
Cal.
Dep’t
Fish
&
Wildlife,
https://www.dfg.ca.gov/wildlife/Bighorn/Desert/Peninsular/Conservation.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2015) (attributing bighorn sheep decline to several human activities, including “habitat loss and
modification, human disturbance, fragmentation due to roads, rail and tram construction, livestock
grazing, disease, poaching, and fire suppression”).
7. Future Climate Change, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/
future.html (last updated Mar. 4, 2014). The projected range depends on which set of predictions
scientists use to calculate the temperature rise. Although all future predictions have uncertainty, scientists
have reached a general consensus that the global temperature is rising. See Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis 131 fig.1.4 (2013) (showing
potential future rise in global temperature projected to 2035); Climate Change Is Not Debateable, CNN
Press Room (Feb. 23, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/23/climate-change-isnot-debateable (“[B]etween 95 percent and 97 percent of scientists agree that climate change is
happening now, that it’s damaging the planet and that it’s manmade.”). Approximately ninety-seven
percent of climate scientists (climatologists) agree that human-caused climate change is occurring.
Consensus: 97 of Climate Scientists Agree, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus (last
visited Feb. 2, 2015) (citing William R. L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility in Climate Change, 107
Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 12,107, 12,107 (2010)); Peter T. Doran & Maggie Kendall Zimmerman,
Examining the Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 90 Eos 22, 23 (2009); see also Naomi Oreskes,
The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 Sci. 1686, 1686 (2004)).
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be unable to adapt to quickly enough to stay where they are.8 Like the
bighorn, thousands of species are responding to the increase in
temperature by moving or changing their species ranges an average of
about seventeen kilometers a decade.9 At this level of movement, most
of these species will encounter land that has been repurposed in some
way for human use.10 Those that cannot survive in a human-dominated
landscape may hit a wall of human development preventing them from
finding suitable habitat elsewhere. These species could be hemmed in by
a landscape changing coincident to climate change on one side, and
human development on the other. Many species in this situation stand a
high chance of going extinct without human intervention to help them
survive.
Relatively recently, humans have begun to manage populations of
previously ignored species under the auspice of conservation.11 As
humans living in a Western society, we tend to see solutions to other
species’ problems through at least two lenses: human and cultural.12 In
the case of climate-sensitive species, both lenses produce skewed results.
From the human lens, unlike almost every other species on earth,
humans have proven resilient in most every ecosystem we have
encountered. Other species cannot acclimate to new habitats as well as
humans can, and this sensitivity to change normally results in a decrease

8. “Adaptation” is a term often used interchangeably with “acclimation.” However, when
biologists refer to adaptation, they are referring to the slow, multigenerational genetic changes that
occur to species as the result of evolutionary pressures on a population. Conversely, individuals of a
species “acclimate” to their surroundings when, for example, they move from a relatively oxygen-rich
lower altitude to an oxygen-poor higher altitude. This acclimation is achieved, for instance, by
producing more red blood cells to make it easier for the circulatory systems to carry enough oxygen to
body tissues. See Ary A. Hoffmann & Carla M. Sgrò, Climate Change and Evolutionary Adaptation,
470 Nature 479, 479 (2011) (discussing species’ evolutionary adaptation to climate change); see also
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 8 (11th ed. 2003) (defining acclimation as the
“physiological adjustment by an organism to environmental change”).
9. See I-Ching Chen et al., Rapid Range Shifts of Species Associated with High Levels of Climate
Warming, 333 Sci. 1024, 1024 (2011) (discussing the results of a meta-analysis of two taxa samples,
representing 764 and 1367 species, respectively). In terms of latitude, species are moving at a “rate of 16.9
kilometers per decade.” Id. Species are also moving up an average of 11 meters in altitude per decade. Id.
10. See Hillary Mayell, Human “Footprint” Seen on 83 Percent of Earth’s Land, Nat’l Geographic
News (Oct. 25, 2002), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/10/1025_021025_HumanFootprint.html
(“[Eighty-three] percent of the total land surface and 98 percent of the areas where it is possible to grow the
world’s three main crops—rice, wheat, and maize—is directly influenced by human activities.”).
11. See generally Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2014).
12. See, e.g., Maria Kallery & Dimitris Psillos, Anthropomorphism and Animism in Early Years

Science: Why Teachers Use Them, How They Conceptualise Them and What Are Their Views on
Their Use, 34 Res. Sci. Educ. 291, 291 (2004) (discussing human anthropomorphization of observed
animal behaviors). This can be seen when humans attribute human emotions to an animal. However,
human perception also affects our attempts to recover species. For example, U.S. wildlife management
policies have primarily been couched in our assumption that these animals are beneficial to humans.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (“[F]ish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.”).
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in species populations—sometimes to the point of extinction.13 In the
human paradigm, one would presume that a rational response to an
unsuitable habitat would be to either alter the habitat or move. For
humans, a move of ten thousand miles would not necessarily spell death;
it would simply require that we practice another viable way of life. Other
species do not have this same behavioral plasticity.
From the cultural lens, Western principles have affected the way we
conserve species in the United States. One of our largest attempts to
protect species has been to create wildlife refuges—land meant to be
protected in perpetuity.14 Fee simple conservation in a climate-changing
world may make sense within the human land use context.15 However, in
the non-human setting, when a lack of necessary resources renders a
species’ land unusable, some individuals of a species on that land may
die, and others may move to survive.16 Especially considering the effect
of climate change on many species’ ranges and some species’ connections
to certain scarce resources,17 fee simple ownership would seem like a
ridiculous system for many species. If, for example, a squirrel is
intimately tied to a species of acorn tree for food and shelter, any land
that does not have these trees would be worthless to that squirrel. If the
tree range moves, so must the squirrel. Likewise, if the species of acorn
tree is dependent on a certain temperature and precipitation range, these
trees cannot survive when viable conditions are not present.
The use of a fee simple paradigm to conserve non-human species is
theoretically possible with active human involvement. Unlike most
species, humans have the capacity to mold a plot of land to meet a wide
variety of needs. On a small scale, we create artificial habitats with exotic
pets in aquariums. Humans have also altered land for other species’ use
13. See infra Part II.A (discussing human-caused species declines primarily as the result of habitat
modification).
14. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-07-1092, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service:
Additional Flexibility Needed to Deal with Farmlands Received from the Department of
Agriculture 6 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/266901.pdf (“[T]he [Fish and Wildlife]
Service . . . has received at least 1,400 easement and fee-simple farmlands from the Farm Service
Agency since 1986 . . . . scattered across 38 states . . . .”); id. at 1 (“Congress consolidated many of
these lands into the National Wildlife Refuge System . . . .”).
15. “Fee simple” is “[a]n interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by
law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs.” Black’s Law Dictionary 733 (10th ed. 2014).
Fee simple ownership is also referred to as ownership in perpetuity. Implicit in the concept of fee simple
ownership is the idea that the boundaries of the property interest do not migrate; they are fixed.
16. For example, see infra Part II.A for a discussion of human-caused species declines due to
reduced resource availability.
17. See Chen et al., supra note 9, at 1024 (stating that species are moving at a “rate of 16.9
kilometers per decade”); see also Camille Parmesan, Ecological and Evolutionary Responses to
Recent Climate Change, 37 Ann. Rev. Ecology, Evolution, & Systematics 637, 637 (2006) (finding
that “[p]redator-prey and plant-insect interactions have been disrupted when interacting species have
responded differently to warming” and that “resource use and dispersal have evolved rapidly at
expanding range margins”).
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on a much larger scale and with much larger species populations. For
example, humans introduced European grasses to the United States
across millions of acres so that European cattle could graze in larger
numbers.18
U.S. regulators and conservationists have looked for fee simple
solutions to species declines, including the conservation of both
federally19 and privately20 owned lands. One such conservation strategy is
conservation banking, which allows the “taking,” or the harming or
killing of individuals of an endangered or threatened species, on one plot
of to-be-developed land on the condition that the permittee compensate
for this loss by buying habitat in a “bank” of land managed to preserve the
target species “in perpetuity.”21 But what happens when the species moves?
This Note argues that a fee simple reserve system is not the best
conservation strategy for species that are sensitive to, and likely to
migrate due to, climate change pressures. Approval of this conservation
method should rest upon a scientific assessment of the likelihood that a
given species will move as a result of climate change. For those species
that are likely to move large distances as early as the next fifty to 100
years, every fee simple acre devoted to conservation that the species can
no longer use represents conservation value lost. In these instances,
regulators should instead adopt a conservation strategy that moves with
the species. To further this policy, this Note suggests that the Fish and
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) adopt a “climate banking” system—a marketbased conservation scheme designed to fund monitoring and
conservation efforts that follow species that are moving. For climatesensitive species, this solution provides a more suitable private-land
conservation strategy than the current conservation banking system.
18. Joseph M. DiTomaso, Invasive Weeds in Rangelands: Species, Impacts, and Management,
48 Weed Sci. 255, 255–57, 259 (2000) (naming several grasses that were introduced from Europe
because American grasses did not grow quickly enough to meet grazing quotas). This is not to say
humans have been entirely successful or deliberate in their introduction of species. But this example
does display one large-scale example of humans changing millions of acres of habitat to manage a
species at otherwise unsustainable levels.
19. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (2014) (“[T]he public
lands [will] be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of . . . ecological, environmental, air
and atmospheric, [and] water resource[s], and . . . will preserve and protect certain public lands in their
natural condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife . . . .”); see also Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a) (2014) (requiring the Secretaries of the Interior and
Agriculture to “establish and implement a program to conserve [endangered and threatened] fish,
wildlife, and plants”). This law applies both to public and private land.
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (prohibiting the “tak[ing] of any [endangered or threatened]
species within the United States [or its territorial seas]” (emphasis added)). This prohibition against
taking does not distinguish between public or private land.
21. Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks, 68 Fed. Reg.
24,753, 24,753 (May 8, 2003) (“A conservation bank is a parcel of land containing natural resource
values that are conserved and managed in perpetuity for listed species and used to offset impacts to
the comparable resource values on non-bank lands occurring elsewhere.”).
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Part I of this Note gives an overview of some of the present and
future dangers species face and then shifts to a general discussion of the
primary U.S. law designed to protect threatened and endangered species:
the Endangered Species Act. Part II discusses conservation banking and
proposed best practices, leading to an overall assessment of the
effectiveness of conservation banking as a conservation strategy. Part III
provides a study of the San Joaquin kit fox, an example of a climatesensitive species that is currently the target of several conservation
banks. Part IV analyzes the adequacy of the responses by other scholars
on the topic of climate change and conservation banking. In Part V, this
Note discusses “climate banking,” a new conservation strategy that
includes adaptive responses to climate change in the core of its
conservation model. Finally, this Note discusses and refutes some
potential drawbacks to this new strategy.

I. An Overview of the Human-Caused Threats
to Vulnerable Species
A. Negative Human Effects on Global Species Populations
The world has entered what two authors have called “the
Anthropocene” epoch, an age in history where human activities have
“major and still growing [planetary] impacts.”22 Historically, human
effects on species have been enormous, and they continue to grow as our
seven-billion-strong population continues to increase at more than twice
the rate of human deaths.23 Humans, just one species out of millions on
Earth, use up to half of the terrestrial surface and over half of the global
surface water.24 Today, humans are a major—likely the largest—cause of
species extinctions.25 Scientists count habitat loss as one of “[t]he main
causes of species extinction,”26 and humans are the largest source of

22. Paul J. Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoermer, The “Anthropocene,” Global Change Newsl.,
May 2000, at 17, 17; see also Rodolfo Dirzo et al., Defaunation in the Anthropocene, 345 Sci. 401, 401
(2014) (referring to the recent wave of species loss as “Anthropocene defaunation”).
23. Current World Population, Worldometers, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (dynamic clock showing the human population as over 7,287,385,650, with
360,000 births per day and 148,600 deaths per day as of this printing).
24. Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystems, 277 Sci. 494, 494 (1997)
(concluding that “[b]etween one-third and one-half of [Earth’s] surface has been transformed by
human action,” as well as “more than half of all accessible surface fresh water”).
25. Georgina Mace et al., Biodiversity, in 1 Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Current
State and Trends 77, 79 (Rashid Hassan et al. eds., 2005) (“Over the past few hundred years humans
may have increased the species extinction rate by as much as three orders of magnitude.”); see also
Shahid Naeem et al., Preserving Nature, in 2 The Endangered Species Act at Thirty: Conserving
Biodiversity in Human-Dominated Landscapes 70, 71 (J. Michael Scott et al. eds., 2006).
26. Mace et al., supra note 25, at 79; see also Naeem et al., supra note 25, at 72. Other humanrelated impacts on species include, inter alia, the introduction of invasive species, hunting, pollution,
and climate change. See Mace et al., supra note 25, at 79; Naeem et al., supra note 25, at 71.
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habitat loss.27 Human-caused climate change also affects species viability
through a combination of habitat loss and ecosystem changes that are
occurring due to local changes in precipitation and temperatures.28
Species extinction is occurring at a rate of as much as 1000 times the
rate species were going extinct before humans began to hunt and farm.29
This amounts to a loss of 150 to 200 species each day.30 This extinction
rate may eventually lead to the loss of as much as fifty-eight percent of
all species worldwide.31
There are currently more than 20,000 threatened species worldwide,32
including 1517 populations listed as being in danger of extinction in the
United States alone.33 Left unchecked, it is clear that humans will continue
habits that lead to species extinctions. Markets have traditionally ignored
species loss as an externality to productive economic activities, such as
farming or foresting.34 It is often even worse when species are valued in
markets—with notable examples of unsustainable exploitation in
rhinoceroses, gorillas, and elephants,35 to name a few.

27. See Naeem et al., supra note 25, at 72 (listing human-caused “habitat modification” as one of
the main—likely the main—source of habitat decline).
28. Id.; see Mace et al., supra note 25, at 79.
29. Stuart L. Pimm et al., The Future of Biodiversity, 269 Sci. 347, 347 (1995) (measuring a range
of an increase of species extinction rates “100 to 1000 times their pre-human levels”).
30. The State of the Planet’s Biodiversity: Key Findings from the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, U.N. Env’t Program, http://www.unep.org/wed/2010/english/biodiversity.asp (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015).
31. Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change 427 Nature 145, 146 (2004).
This number varies greatly. In his analysis, Thomas estimates the total number of extinctions to range
from as few as eleven percent of all species to as many as fifty-eight percent. See id. at 146, tbl.1; see
also Mace et al., supra note 25, at 79 (estimating that “[b]etween 12 and 52 of species . . . are
threatened with extinction”).
32. Table 1: Numbers of Threatened Species by Major Groups of Organisms (1996–2013), IUCN
RedList, http://www.iucnredlist.org/documents/summarystatistics/2013_1_RL_Stats_Table1.pdf (last
updated July 8, 2013). This number should be much higher. Of the over 70,000 species it has evaluated,
the IUCN found 28.5 to be threatened. The total number of described species, however, is over
1.7 million, and the total number of species may be over 8 million. If nearly thirty percent of the 8 million
total species are threatened, then the total number of endangered species may amount to 2.28 million. See id.
33. Summary of Listed Species Listed Populations and Recovery Plans, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., Envtl. Conservation Online Sys., http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/Boxscore.do (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015). Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) counts thirteen species twice due to distinct
geographical ranges. Id.
34. See, e.g., J.N. Pretty et al., An Assessment of the Total External Costs of UK Agriculture,
65 Agric. Sys. 113, 125 (2000) (discussing the externalization of biodiversity loss from farming in the
United Kingdom).
35. Edie Freedman, Tracking the Black Market in Endangered Species, O’Reilly (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://animals.oreilly.com/tracking-the-black-market-in-endangered-species (listing, inter alia, the
price for gorillas at $40,000, elephants at $28,200, and one kilogram of Rhino horn at $97,000). The
reasons for black market prices are complex and dependent on the region. For the purposes of this
discussion, it is only necessary to note how valuable these species can be to some buyers.
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B. The Endangered Species Act as a Response to Species Declines
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) was created as a response to
the massive loss of species habitat and population numbers in the United
States from the start of Western colonization to 1973, when the ESA was
enacted.36 Congress explicitly addressed this concern, noting that
“various species . . . have been rendered extinct as a consequence of
economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern
and conservation.”37
A species becomes “listed” under the ESA, meaning that it qualifies
for protection, when the Secretary of the Interior finds that a species
faces a danger of,38 or will likely face a danger of,39 becoming extinct
either globally or locally. This protection applies to species on both
public40 and private lands.41 Consistent with current scientific findings
listing habitat loss as a key risk to species,42 a central mechanism of
species conservation is habitat protection. Because of this, FWS prohibits
certain types of habitat modification on private land if this modification
would directly harm a listed species.43

II. Species Conservation on Private Land
This Part first discusses the perverse incentive the ESA brought to
bear on listed species present on private land, and then provides both the
purpose and structure of conservation banking as a solution to this problem.
A. The Perverse Incentives of the ESA
It is difficult to imagine how species conservation could be
successful without cooperation from private landowners. Private
landowners own nearly seventy percent of the land in the United
States.44 This percentage of privately owned land rises to as much as

36. J. Michael Scott et al., Introduction, in 1 The Endangered Species Act at Thirty: Renewing
the Conservation Promise 3, 3–4 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2006) (“[M]ore than five hundred species
formerly found in the United States are presumed to be extinct . . . .”).
37. Endangered Species Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2014).
38. See id. § 1532(6) (defining “endangered species”).
39. See id. § 1532(20) (defining “threatened species”).
40. Id. § 1534(a).
41. Id. § 1538(1)(a)–(g) (listing the different types of prohibited acts which apply on both private
and public land).
42. See Naeem et al., supra note 25, at 72–73.
43. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995)
(holding that the definition of harm “include[s] ‘significant habitat modification or degradation that
actually kills or injures wildlife’” (quoting Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plans Rule,
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995))). Under this definition of harm (one type of taking), private landowners can
be liable under the ESA for using their land in a way that is unsuitable for species conservation.
44. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Managing the Working Landscape, in 1 The Endangered Species
Act at Thirty: Renewing the Conservation Promise, supra note 36, at 101, 101.
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ninety percent in some states.45 The remaining thirty percent of land in
the United States is mostly underproductive land.46 As much as eighty
percent of listed species use private land to some extent.47 To rest a
conservation strategy solely on thirty percent of the least productive
lands in the nation would likely fail.
Since the ESA prohibits the “taking” of listed species, no matter
where they are found,48 the Act places concrete restrictions on private
land use when a listed species is present on private land.49 Although the
ESA is meant to protect species from harm, the restriction on private
land use where a listed species is found often provided a perverse
incentive for private landowners to harm the very species Congress
intended the ESA to protect.50
Often, landowners purchase land for a specific economic purpose
that could harm members of a listed species. The discovery of an
endangered species on this land could lead to use restrictions that would
prevent landowners from maximizing the expected economic gain from
their land. If, for instance, a logger accidentally cuts down a tree that is
home to endangered owlets and FWS finds that all the landowner’s trees
are suitable endangered owl territory, the logger may be enjoined from
cutting any of the remaining trees on her land. The discovery of a listed
species could turn a profitable plot of land into a financially toxic one,
especially if the landowner purchased this land with the intent of
regularly harvesting lumber.
This threat of substantial financial loss creates an incentive for the
landowner to hide the existence of a listed species on her land from the
federal government and others.51 The ESA comes into force against

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. “Take” is defined in the ESA as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect.” Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2014).
49. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2014) (stating the
definition of harm “include[s] significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering”).
50. See generally Daowei Zhang, Endangered Species and Timber Harvesting: The Case of RedCockaded Woodpeckers, 42 Econ. Inquiry 150 (2004) (discussing preemptive habitat destruction to
prevent use by endangered species); Amara Brook et al., Landowners’ Responses to an Endangered
Species Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 Conservation Biology 1638
(2003) (discussing landowners’ negative responses to the potential listing of a mouse species, noting that
many landowners sought to harm the species on their land and would not allow for information gathering
on their land). After the Supreme Court decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon, there is no doubt that at least some modifications of private land that “actually
harm” a listed species are forbidden under the ESA. 515 U.S. 687, 702–03 (1995) (rejecting private
landowners’ argument that the ESA places no extra burden on private landowners because if the Secretary
of the Interior wanted to, she could simply acquire owners’ land for public use under eminent domain).
51. Of course, there is also a financial incentive to rob a bank. The ESA is designed to criminally
penalize anyone who takes a species. However, the bank analogy does not fully capture the “take”
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private landowners if they actually harm a species, or if harm would
result from a landowner’s proposed land use. Conversely, the landowner
will only be liable if and when: (1) a federal agent or concerned citizen
learns about the existence of the listed species on the owner’s land, and
(2) there is admissible evidence of a taking. The low likelihood of
reprisal and the frequently high stakes that are involved can create a
strong economic motivation to kill, hide, or remove a listed species or its
habitat from the land before the existence of the species becomes known
to others. This creates what one author has labeled a “perverse
incentive[] . . . to ‘shoot, shovel, and shut up.’”52 Or, to put a spin on the
popular idiom “what you do not know cannot hurt you,” the landowner
may conclude that “what the enforcer does not know cannot be harm.”
B. Conservation Incentives and Incidental Take Permits
Aldo Leopold once observed, “conservation will ultimately boil
down to rewarding the private landowner who conserves the public
interest.”53 Congress first authorized the use of conservation incentives
by amending section 10 of the ESA in 1982.54 The goals of these policies
are both to remove some of the negative incentives the harsh language of
the ESA creates, as well as to add positive inducements for private
landowners to willingly enlist the use of their private property into the
conservation of federally listed species.55 All of the incentives that
section 10 provide must flow through the incidental take permitting
process.56 Incidental take permits (“ITPs”) allow the “taking [of listed
species] otherwise prohibited by [the ESA] if such taking is incidental
to . . . the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”57 For example, if a
housing developer wishes to cut down trees that are part of endangered
marbled murrelet nesting sites, she must request an ITP from FWS
claiming she is carrying out some otherwise lawful activity. This is in

dynamic. In the example of endangered species habitat on private land, there are no security alarms or
CCTV cameras watching a person’s every move. A landowner who takes a species or destroys habitat
often leaves little trace of either. The criminal deterrence aspect of the ESA is probably mildly
effective. Nevertheless, the minimal threat of reprisal and the potentially large economic impacts both
indicate that criminal deterrence alone will not likely save species. The threat of the stick does not
refute the existence of the carrot.
52. Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for
Streamlining the Process, 23 Ecology L.Q. 369, 382 (1996).
53. Aldo Leopold, The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays 202 (Susan L. Flader
& J. Baird Callicott eds., 1991).
54. Sarah Matsumoto et al., Citizens’ Guide to the Endangered Species Act 35 (2003).
55. See id. at 47 (discussing a 1997 congressional bill intended to enhance existing “incentives for
private landowners to protect species and their habitat”).
56. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2014) (discussing incidental take
permitting requirements).
57. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
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contrast to the harshness of the pre-section 10 ESA that would give FWS
no choice but to deny any land use that harmed listed species habitat.
There are limitations on FWS’s discretion to allow the incidental
taking of listed species. The permitting agent is only allowed to approve
incidental takes if the permittee (the land developer), “to the maximum
extent practicable, minimize[s] and mitigate[s] the impacts of such
taking,” and “the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
survival and recovery of the species in the wild.”58 An approved ITP will
enumerate conditions the developer must fulfill to ensure that she
mitigates development impacts and does not further threaten the survival
of the species.59 The prescribed conditions can either be performed on
the landowner’s land60 or off-site in a compensatory mitigation scheme
such as conservation banking.61 Of course, the incentive for these
programs is the promise that FWS will leave the developer alone so long
as she satisfies the conditions in her ITP. In the case of conservation
banking, both the developer and the banker may receive an economic
benefit from the conservation in the form of a development permit or
funding to conserve land.62
Section 10 truly began to take hold in the 1990s, amid a conservative
swing in Congress.63 Then-Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt,
endeavored to make the ESA more politically palatable to congressional
conservatives by promoting compromises to reduce perceived conflicts
between development and species conservation.64 These incentives have
taken various forms, including safe harbor agreements,65 candidate
conservation agreements,66 and habitat conservation plans,67 a subset of
which are conservation banks.68

58. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii), (iv).
59. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iv).
60. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2014) (defining a
habitat conservation plan as a plan “required by section 10(a)(2)(A) of the ESA that an applicant
must submit when applying for an incidental take permit”).
61. See Memorandum from Dir. of U.S. Dep’t of the Interior on Guidance for the Establishment,
Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks to the Reg’l Dirs. of Regions 1–7 & Manager of Cal. Nev.
Operations 4 (May 2, 2003), available at https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/Conservation_
Banking_Guidance.pdf [hereinafter Banking Guidance] (explaining that the legal basis for
conservation banking is grounded in section 10).
62. See id. at 1 (discussing the benefits of conservation banking for developers and bankers). For
a discussion on conservation banking, see infra Part II.C.
63. See Dale D. Goble, Evolution of At-Risk Species Protection, in 2 The Endangered Species
Act at Thirty: Conserving Biodiversity in Human-Dominated Landscapes, supra note 25, at 6, 21
(explaining that Republican victories in 1994 led to increased debate regarding the ESA).
64. See id. at 21–22.
65. Thompson, supra note 44, at 119.
66. Id. at 122.
67. Id. at 106.
68. Jessica Fox et al., Conservation Banking, in 2 The Endangered Species Act at Thirty:
Conserving Biodiversity in Human-Dominated Landscapes supra note 25, at 228, 228.
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C. Conservation Banking
Conservation banking curiously started in 1995 with a bad bank
loan.69 Before 1995, ITPs were issued but there was no guarantee that
FWS would approve these proposed conservation plans, which created
high transaction costs.70 Bank of America obtained Carlsbad Highlands,
a proposed housing development, through the foreclosure of a 6.8 million
dollar loan.71 This land was valued far below the value of the loan as a
result of a late-1980s California housing bust.72 This property was, and
still is, the site of the habitat of the coastal California gnatcatcher, an
endangered bird.73 Listed as threatened under the ESA, the presence of
the coastal California gnatcatcher further decreased the value of the
land.74 After Bank of America considered its options, it decided to push
for the creation of a “banking” system.75 Under this new banking system,
conservation bank owners were contractually bound to conserve species
and their habitat in “conservation bank” land preapproved by FWS for
ITP mitigation purposes. Because the bank land is preapproved for
mitigation, FWS assured developers that buying banking credits would
allow the agency to quickly approve the developers’ mitigation
proposals, reducing time, cost, and uncertainty.76 The Carlsbad
Highlands conservation bank is still operational today, its credits fully
sold.77
In 2003, nearly eight years after California established its first
conservation bank, FWS officially approved of the practice and wrote
guidelines to implement conservation banking nationwide.78 According
to FWS guidelines, conservation banking is beneficial from at least four
69. Anne T. Lawrence, The Emergence of Conservation Banking in Southern California, in Ahead of
the Curve: Cases of Innovation in Environmental Management 93, 93 (Ken Green et al. eds., 2001).
70. See id. at 100. James Jackson, Vice President of Bank of America’s Costa Mesa office,
explained “how screwed up the [federal ITP] system was . . . [developers would] go out and find some
property for mitigation, take it to the feds, and the government would [refuse to approve it].” Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 95–96.
73. Carlsbad Highlands Conservation Bank, Species Banking, http://us.speciesbanking.com/
pages/dynamic/banks.page.php?page_id=7191 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
74. Id. Traditionally, endangered species on private land inhibited a variety of potential land uses.
Even in the case of incidental take permitting, land use is restricted and landowner duties to protect
the listed species increase. This places a cloud on the title, decreasing the value of the land. See Ike C.
Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospects for
Reform, 24 Cumb. L. Rev. 1, 67 (1993) (citing National Environmental Forum Survey, Times-Mirror Mags.,
June 1992, at 23) (discussing land devaluation arising from ESA species protection on private land).
75. See Lawrence, supra note 69, at 100–01 (summarizing Bank of America’s efforts in creating the
conservation banking system).
76. Id. at 100 (stating that a “preapproved bank . . . would take the guessing out of [mitigation
proposals],” and that preapproved banks would create a “superior product [that would get] preferential
treatment in the [mitigation] marketplace”).
77. Carlsbad Highlands Conservation Bank, supra note 73.
78. See generally Banking Guidance, supra note 61.
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perspectives: FWS’s, the developer’s,79 the owner of the conservation
bank’s (“banker”),80 and the species’.81 First, banking is attractive to
FWS because it encourages participation in federal conservation efforts
by private landowners.82 Banks can be large enough to mitigate dozens of
projects, and tend to be better managed than other mitigation strategies.83
Second, the developer benefits because banking “saves time and money
by identifying pre-approved conservation areas [and] sellers [and by]
simplifying the regulatory compliance process and associated
paperwork.”84 Third, from the banker’s perspective, banking can turn the
financial liability of having listed species on her land into a long-term
income-generating activity.85 Finally, banking is beneficial to species
because a species ostensibly has a professionally restored and managed
habitat available for eternity, through efforts such as revegetation and
stream improvement.
The conservation banking system is arguably more protective of
species than many other of today’s private land use conservation
strategies. As its name suggests, conservation banking requires the
landowner to conserve the species. In the context of the ESA, a mandate
to “conserve” is stronger than the typical section 10 mandate to
“mitigate” adverse impacts as a result of the incidental take.86 Mitigation
is, for the most part, a negative duty, as it requires that a landowner do
nothing directly to harm a species and to limit the incidental harm her
actions cause to the species.87 Conversely, the ESA defines conservation
79. It is possible that ITPs may be granted for purposes other than what is traditionally referred
to as “development.” The label “developer” is used in this Note as a label to help differentiate
between the buyer of credits (developer) and the seller of credits (banker).
80. The literature does not refer to the group of landowners that own conservation banks as
bankers, but the name seems appropriate. The landowner-banker conducts a transaction that deposits
the value of the developer’s investment in a bank. Of course, this comparison is not directly parallel.
Nevertheless, the label is suitable, and it serves the purpose of distinguishing between the parties
involved in banking transactions.
81. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 1.
82. See id. at 2 (“Conservation banking reduces the piecemeal approach to conservation efforts that
can result from individual projects by establishing larger reserves and enhancing habitat connectivity.”).
83. Id. (explaining that conservation banks can be “large enough to accommodate the mitigation of
multiple projects”). For a list of comments discussing the failure of other types of mitigation tools, see
Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,595 (Apr. 10, 2008)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) (“[T]here is greater risk and uncertainty associated with in-lieu fee
programs regarding the implementation of the compensatory mitigation project and its adequacy to
compensate for lost functions and services.”); see also id. at 19,619 (“[O]n-site avoidance often result[s] in
small areas for compensatory mitigation projects, which are unlikely to function properly.”).
84. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 1.
85. Id.
86. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2014) (provision requiring
incidental take permittees to “minimize and mitigate” adverse impacts to listed species that will result
from their proposed land use).
87. Mitigation, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2014) Mitigation includes:
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action.
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as the use of all methods necessary to recover listed species.88 Although
“conservation” in the context of the ESA is a term of art that does not
necessarily require conservation bank owners to fulfill the statutory
conservation mandate of the ESA, conservation banking does typically
impose more land use restrictions and other affirmative duties on the
bank owner. Bankers are typically required to:
 enter into a Conservation Banking Agreement with the Service;
 grant a conservation easement to an eligible third party,
precluding future development of the property and restricting certain
land uses;
 develop a long-term management plan for the conservation
bank; and
 provide funding for monitoring and long-term management of
the conservation bank.89

These assurances are typically more elaborate than the conditions of
other ITPs.90 For instance, most other permits will not typically require a
conservation easement on the land set aside for mitigation purposes, but
this is commonplace in the context of conservation banking.
The process of establishing a bank and receiving an ITP is relatively
straightforward. Banking is market driven, so it should only exist where
there is a demand for development on land inhabited or used by listed
species.91 When the developer decides to develop land that contains a
listed species or its habitat, she may apply for an ITP that would allow
her to “take” a small number of the listed species so long as the taking is
(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its
implementation.
(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected
environment.
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance
operations during the life of the action.
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or
environments.

Id. I refer to this as a negative duty because, unlike a conservation mandate that would require a
landowner to take active steps to improve a species’ habitat, mitigation only requires the landowner to
take steps to ensure the species is no worse off than it was before the landowner’s activities.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
89. For Landowners—Conservation Banking: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/landowners/conservation-banking-faq.html (last updated July 15,
2013).
90. Habitat conservation plans (“HCPs”) require the permittee to fulfill mitigation conditions in
the ITP. However, HCPs do not require the permittee to place a conservation easement on her land,
restricting many land uses for the foreseeable future. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
and Plants Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(3) (2014) (not listing a conservation easement as a mandatory
term in a habitat conservation plan).
91. See John Merrifield, A Market Approach to Conserving Biodiversity, 16 Ecological Econ.
217, 221 (1996) (describing the effect of market forces on market-driven environmental trading
systems, such as conservation banks).
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incidental to the purpose of the permit.92 Since the proposed
development will take a listed species, FWS will place conditions on the
approval of the ITP that provides for the minimization and mitigation of
adverse effects of the developer’s proposed land use.93 If there is a
conservation bank in the area,94 FWS or the developer can request that
the developer’s mitigation occur through the purchase of bank “credits.”95
D. Credit Concerns
A banking credit is “a unit of measure representing the
quantification of species or habitat conservation values within a
conservation bank.”96 FWS explains this more fully in its guidelines:
The values of the natural resources are translated into quantified
“credits.” Typically, the credit price will include funding for the longterm natural resource management and protection of those values.
Project proponents are, therefore, able to complete their conservation
needs through a one time purchase of credits from the conservation
bank. This allows “one-stop-shopping” for the project proponent,
providing conservation and management for listed species in one
simplified transaction.97

Despite its relatively innocuous definition, the concept of
“quantifying” nature has been hotly debated.98 Scholars have noted that
assigning a value to listed species habitat runs a high risk of
miscalculation.99 Just like any other market that trades in dissimilar
items, for conservation banking to exist there must be fungibility, or the
ability to find a common trading denominator.100 This fungibility is
92. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2014) (providing for approval of ITPs
for the incidental take of listed species).
93. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2014) (mandating conditions that minimize and mitigate harm to listed
species in a habitat conservation plan).
94. The service area is typically “located within areas designated in recovery plans” of listed
species. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 8. Developers wishing to develop within a given species’
protected range will normally be able to compensate for the use of this land by purchasing credits in a
bank that is the species habitat range near the development site. See id. at 8–9.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id. at 17.
97. Id. at 2.
98. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law,
53 Stan. L. Rev. 607, 607 (2000) (stating that environmental trading markets often trade in
“nonfungibilities” of “type, time, and space”).
99. See generally id. (discussing the complications with the commodification of natural
resources).
100. The easiest example of this is the use of currency. In many early markets, people traded one
good for another—such as a pair of shoes for two shirts. Because most items are of unequal value in
the market, they are said to lack fungibility. Conversely, currency creates a common denominator for
consumers to exchange. Additionally, the dollar is fungible—each U.S. dollar is of identical value to
the market. Benjamin Geva, From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History-on Commerce,
Tyranny, and the Modern Law of Money, 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 115, 118 n.16 (1987). In the
conservation banking market, “credits” serve a similar function as the U.S. dollar. Developers who

Whipps_13 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete)

February 2015]

CLIMATE ADAPTIVE SOLUTIONS

3/21/2015 4:28 PM

573

largely a false construct, as many of the items being traded will not be
equivalent.101 Nonetheless, environmental market participants must
equate the value between one lost acre of to-be-developed land that is
currently home to the coastal California gnatcatcher on Blackacre to the
value of the to-be-conserved gnatcatcher habitat on Greenacre. To do so
requires some method of valuation based on our understanding of each
land value as it relates to the species. For instance, if gnatcatchers require
scrub oak for nesting and only prey on a certain type of coastal insect,
the credit may be valued based on the availability of each habitat feature
in Blackacre and Greenacre, respectively. If Greenacre is rich in prime
habitat relative to Blackacre, then Greenacre’s habitat will be valued
more highly per acre than Blackacre’s.
As FWS conservation banking guidelines suggest, the valuation
system is mostly static. There is only one transaction between the
developer and banker and only one set value for Greenacre’s credits.102
Once both are valued, these values practically never change. FWS
contends that it can change the value of bank credits, but it is highly
constrained from doing so for two notable reasons. First, once a
transaction is complete, it cannot be undone.103 The permittee will not be
required to purchase more credits if the banker’s land becomes less
valuable. FWS is allowed to penalize bankers, but doing so may force the
banker to devote banking funds to litigation that could better be spent
maintaining and restoring habitat. Second, even if FWS could change the
value or suspend the sale of the remaining credits in a bank, this threat is
moot in cases where a banker has completely sold all of the bank’s
credits.104 This rigidity prevents any meaningful change once a bank is
established. Even if the needs of the species change or new conservation
must mitigate the destruction of ten acres of an endangered species’ habitat can accomplish this
mitigation through the purchase of credits on the banking market. At least in the eyes of the banking
market, this makes the destroyed and banking habitats fungible.
101. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 98, at 662–64 (discussing the nonfungibilities of type, space,
and time).
102. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 9 (stating that, for a certain type of conservation bank,
“credits should be based on the biological values of the bank at the time the bank agreement is established”).
103. FWS conservation bank guidelines do not explicitly state that credits cannot be recalled, but it
is nonetheless unlikely that they can be. For example, in the section of the guidelines labelled
“Remedial Actions,” FWS does not state that credit recall is an acceptable remedy for bankers who do
not adequately perform their conservation duties. See id. at 14. The most drastic measure envisioned
by the guidelines is to force the absent banker to sell her land to a responsible third party who will
continue to conserve it. See id.
104. Once a credit is sold, its value is fixed. Changing the value of sold credits would only add
instability to the market. Thus, if a bank’s credits have all been sold, FWS no longer considers altering
the value of the credits as a penalty. Although FWS has not indicated that it would consider penalizing
negligent bankers by forcing them to buy credits in other banks to compensate for the low quality of
their own bank, this could be a possible remedy. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 14
(discussing remedial action in the form of suspending pre-sale credits but not listing a creditreevaluation remedy for banks that have sold all their credits).
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strategies become available, the conditions in the banking agreement
may prove resistant to the addition of new strategies. In light of
something as dynamic and challenging as climate change, this resistance
to change may not adequately conserve climate-sensitive species.
This rigidity in credit values is deliberate. Without predictable credit
prices, both bankers and permittees may find the investment to be too
risky.105 Conservation banking markets need fungibility to function, so
FWS pushes habitat features into artificial boxes of similar habitat
features.106 As the founder of the banking system recognized, “a
preapproved bank . . . would take the guessing out of [the incidental take
permitting process].”107 A lack of market clarity could very easily push
many, if not most, market participants away from buying and selling
credits.
A fee simple, single-transaction market system may provide market
stability, but it also creates the risk of more externalities or permanent
losses for which the bank does not account.108 The largest potential
externality of a one-off investment in species habitat is that it cannot
account for that land’s future value to the target species or any other
species. In the realm of climate change, habitat could be irreversibly
modified in the next fifty to one hundred years, let alone in the duration
imagined by the artificial concept of ownership in perpetuity. Rising sea
levels could swallow coastal habitat; drought could dry and then burn
forest habitat. In short, the banking system externalizes the reality that
many species can or must move from their current habitats in the coming
decades. In this future scenario, conservation banks would externalize all
conservation costs that must occur outside of the bank’s boundaries
when banking species move off the banking habitat. Every acre of
banking land originally intended for perpetual conservation that can no
longer be used by the species is bank value lost. Every new acre enlisted
outside of the bank that must add protective measures for listed species
due to species movement is a cost for which the conservation banking
system does not account.

105. Silvia Wissel & Frank Wätzold, A Conceptual Analysis of the Application of Tradable
Permits to Biodiversity Conservation, 24 Conservation Biology 404, 407 (2010) (“High transaction
costs may reduce market activity and may arise as a result of complicated and time-consuming
administrative procedures.”).
106. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 98, at 662–64. For example, the cost of establishing a bank
may be prohibitive without some initial up-front investment. It follows that there may be a lag
between when the listed species habitat is destroyed on the developed land and when the bank is able
to compensate for that loss. When a species lives without suitable habitat comparable to the habitat it
lost, this time is permanently lost; it can never be recompensated.
107. Lawrence, supra note 69, at 100 (discussing the historically ambiguous ITP approval policy of FWS).
108. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 98, at 624–25, 662–64.
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III. Case Study: The San Joaquin Kit Fox
The San Joaquin kit fox illustrates why banking may not be wellsuited for some species. The kit fox is a native California species
historically found throughout California’s San Joaquin Valley.109
Adapted to desert and grassland habitat,110 its numbers began to decline
dramatically due to increased human presence and land development.111
Now, the kit fox lives on the small fragments of undeveloped land that
can still support it—mostly on the Valley’s outskirts.112
A study by M. Rebecca Shaw and others modeled the effect that
climate change would have on the remaining populations of the San
Joaquin kit fox.113 Shaw projected the kit foxes’ likely climate changerelated movement from today to 2100.114 The Shaw study concluded that
within fifty to one hundred years, little to no suitable habitat would
remain throughout the entire area currently home to the kit fox.115 The
Shaw study found that “[e]stablishing a static network of connected
reserves through acquisition or set-asides may not be effective in the
future given ecological, economic, and social responses to climate change
are likely to be nonlinear and multidirectional.”116
The high likelihood that the kit fox will move away from most or all
of the lands it is currently inhabiting makes it a difficult species to
manage within a fee simple paradigm, and conservation banking will
likely not be an adequate conservation solution. Nonetheless, the kit fox
is a current target species in at least five conservation banks.117 In the
Palo Prieto Conservation Bank, it is the only species targeted for
protection, and in the Haera Wildlife Conservation Bank, it is one of

109. Endangered Species Prot. Program, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Endangered Species
Facts: San Joaquin Kit Fox 1 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/espp/factsheets/san-joaquinkitfox.pdf [hereinafter Kit Fox Facts].
110. Id. (describing kit fox habitat as “largely annual grassland”); see also Theresa Nogeire et al.,
Presentation on Impacts of Habitat Loss, Climate Change and Pesticide Exposure on Kit Fox
Populations at the Ecological Society of America (Aug. 5–10, 2012) (stating that kit foxes are “desertadapted”).
111. See Kit Fox Facts, supra note 109, at 1.
112. Id.
113. See M. Rebecca Shaw et al., Economic Costs of Achieving Current Conservation Goals in the
Future as Climate Changes, 26 Conservation Biology 385, 389 tbl.1 (2012) (identifying the kit fox as
having a narrow climatic range, a long dispersal distance, and requiring at least 215,501 hectares of
land to survive as a species).
114. Id. at 387.
115. Id. at 391 fig.2 (graph showing the ratio of undeveloped “area with suitable climate . . . to the
baseline conservation goal under climate change”).
116. Id. at 394.
117. Conservation and Mitigation Banks in California Approved by CDFW, Cal. Dep’t of Fish &
Wildlife, https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/Conservation/Planning/Banking/Approved-Banks (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Approved California Banks] (listing currently approved conservation banks
in California, including those for the San Joaquin kit fox).
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only two protected species.118 If Shaw’s models are correct, then by as
early as 2050, neither the banks nor their surrounding lands will provide
suitable habitat for the kit fox due to likely changes in vegetation and
water availability, which could eliminate suitable resources for the fox
and its prey.119
Banking may be a good short-term solution for the kit fox. It
provides the fox with suitable, maintained habitat mostly free of
pesticides and land uses that are incompatible with the fox’s needs.120
However, conservation banking will likely not provide a long-term
solution in light of the kit fox’s predicted response to climate change.
Bankers who attempt to dutifully maintain kit fox habitat may
nonetheless find that kit foxes, their habitat, or their food sources have
moved. Alternatively, if the conservation bank habitat remains suitable
as land outside of the bank becomes unsuitable, the banking system may
create an ecological “island” population of kit foxes.121 This “island”
population may then be unable to rejoin or move with larger populations of
the fox that could potentially move great distances due to climate change.

IV. Potential Solutions to Species Movement Due to Climate
Change Within the Conservation Bank Paradigm
Relatively few authors have addressed the issue of climate
adaptation as it relates to conservation banking. One set of authors
suggests maintaining the current banking system, but handling climatechange issues on a case-by-case basis due to “the difficulty in predicting
the magnitude and impact of climate changes in specific regions.”122
However, these authors do not suggest how this case-by-case analysis

118. Id.
119. Nogeire et al., supra note 110; see Basic Facts About San Joaquin Kit Foxes, Defenders of
Wildlife, http://www.defenders.org/san-joaquin-kit-fox/basic-facts (last visited Feb. 2, 2015)
(discussing threats to the kit fox, including drought, climate change, and habitat modification, which
make it difficult for kit foxes to find food).
120. Nogeire et al., supra note 110 (summary of the effects of climate change and pesticides on kit
fox populations); see also Paul Schaefer, Kit Fox Gets Some Protection in California, Envtl. News
Network (Sept. 27, 2007, 7:41 PM), http://www.enn.com/wildlife/article/23452 (listing some conservation
measures undertaken at a kit fox conservation bank intended to “maintain or enhance the health and
ecology of the natural habitat”).
121. A habitat “island” could be any species habitat that is separated from other suitable habitat
on all sides by unsuitable habitat. See Angela D. Yu & Simon A. Lei, Equilibrium Theory of Island
Biogeography: A Review, in Shrubland Ecosystem Genetics and Biodiversity: Proceedings 163
(2001), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_p021.pdf (commenting on “the theoretical
similarities between [ocean] islands and fragmented mainland landscapes”).
122. Robert Bonnie & David S. Wilcove, Ecological Considerations, in Conservation &
Biodiversity Banking: A Guide to Setting Up and Running Biodiversity Credit Trading
Systems 59 (Nathaniel Carroll et al. eds., 2008).
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might be conducted; their only advice is to stay away from species’ upper
and lower habitat ranges.123
At least one author has analyzed this problem in depth. In his Note,
Tristan Kimbrell found that conservation banking, as it currently exists,
may be insufficient to protect listed species.124 Kimbrell analyzed three
alternative strategies for confronting the issue of conservation bank
species moving: (1) maintaining the current banking system as-is, (2)
proactively purchasing banking land where species will likely move, and
(3) forcing current bankers to either purchase other banks’ credits or buy
more banking land when species have moved off their lands.125
Kimbrell rejects leaving the banking system “as-is”126 for reasons
already addressed in this Note.127 Namely, the species may move, leaving the
banker with the compulsory yet depressing task of maintaining a habitat for
a species that is no longer present. Kimbrell also eliminates the second
solution of proactively creating banks in potential future species
locations.128 Kimbrell concludes that this solution will likely fail because,
even with our best modeling of future species movements, models will
likely “not be able to accurately predict where a listed species will occur
in the future,” and such a modeling system would be costly.129 This
banking policy would also be unable to predict future land use changes
that may decrease the quality or the effectiveness of a future bank.130
Kimbrell finally settles on a “stepping-stone approach,” where the
“conservation bank owner must buy land where the species currently
exists and must either create a conservation easement for those new
lands, or buy credits for that species in another conservation bank where
the species currently exists.”131 Kimbrell suggests that current bankers
would be able and willing to afford this because bank owners can
terminate the conservation easement on their land then sell it, or they
could alternatively use the money earned from the original bank
purchase to purchase a conservation easement or bank credits on new
land.132 Under Kimbrell’s proposal, conservation bank land must be
123. See id. (suggesting a case-by-case approach for siting conservation banks and advising bankers to
use caution when siting near the southern or northern limits of species ranges, but offering no further advice).
124. See Tristan Kimbrell, Note, Moving Species and Non-Moving Reserves: Conservation Banking and
the Impact of Global Climate Change, 22 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 119, 120 (2010) (explaining that when
“species migrate[] away from the conservation bank land due to climate change or some other ecological
interaction, . . . developers are developing land but the species is not being protected in the long-term”).
125. Id. at 139.
126. Id. at 119, 141–43 (noting that “[m]oving species present a problem for non-moving preserves
because the species meant to be protected may migrate out of the fixed preserve”).
127. See supra Part III.
128. Kimbrell, supra note 124, at 145.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 146.
132. Id.
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easily interchangeable with new, equally valued land where the species
currently exists. One acre in the banker’s old bank would simply be
replaced by one new acre where the species has moved. The conservation
easement that the banker has placed on the banking land could
essentially be removed from the old banking land and transplanted to the
new land. The cost to improve the new plot of land must also be
accounted for in the initial credit purchase in the old bank.
Kimbrell’s approach will likely fail for several reasons. First,
Kimbrell does not account for the dynamics of multispecies or
multipurpose banks. For instance, the majority of conservation banks in
California are set up for multiple species, or for both species and
wetlands mitigation.133 Since conservation banking and wetlands
mitigation—a market-based conservation system for wetlands—flow
through different statutes and require separate credit sales and
permitting processes, it would not likely be as simple as a banker pulling
up tent poles and relocating with the species.134 In addition, species will
move off the banker’s property in any direction that contains suitable
habitat.135 This problem may be compounded in the case of a
multispecies bank, since different species tend to respond to climate
change and habitat modifications differently.136 With these factors in
mind, a land sale and relocation mandate for bankers could range from
being financially stringent to impossible.
Kimbrell’s preferred solution also ignores the subjective attachment
that landowners have with their land.137 If the banking contract
practically requires landowners to be disgorged from their lands to afford

133. See Approved California Banks, supra note 117.
134. The Army Corps of Engineers and Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to
permit wetland dredging and filling through section 404 of the Clean Water Act. Clean Water Act
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2014). These agencies have interpreted this authority to allow for
mitigation banking, a market-based credit system akin to conservation banking. See Mitigation
Banking Factsheet, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/
mitbanking.cfm (last updated Mar. 20, 2014) (defining mitigation banks, and stating that “[t]he value
of a bank is defined in ‘compensatory mitigation credits’”). The section 404 permitting authority is
independent of the authority to approve ITPs for listed species through section 10 of the ESA. Even if
it would make sense for an endangered species to be protected on another site, a banker who has sold
both species and wetlands credits would not be able to abdicate her duties under the Clean Water Act.
The banker would still be required to maintain the wetlands located within the original bank for
mitigation banking purposes.
135. See Shaw et al., supra note 113, at 394 (describing species dispersal in response to climate
change as “nonlinear and multidirectional”).
136. Id. at 389 tbl.1 (showing conservation goals, ranging from narrow climatic range and short
dispersal distance to wide climatic range and long dispersal distance).
137. See Po-Hsin Lai & Urs P. Kreuter, Examining the Direct and Indirect Effects of

Environmental Change and Place Attachment on Land Management Decisions in the Hill Country of
Texas, USA, 104 Landscape & Urb. Plan. 320, 321 (noting that people often form “emotional ties
[with their land] that provide an anchor for individuals to cultivate a sense of self, self-esteem, and
belonging”).
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credits in other banks when a target species moves, this could act as a
disincentive for would-be bank owners who would like to keep their land
whether they retain the profit from a conservation bank or not.
Landowners in this category may refuse to enter into new conservation
banking contracts, even in the unlikely event that these new contracts
proved more lucrative. This would further weaken an already thin
banking market, which would make it more difficult for bankers to fulfill
Kimbrell’s suggested requirement of purchasing new credits or
easements when species move.
In addition, conservation easements are likely more difficult to
remove than Kimbrell suggests. An easement is a property right in
perpetuity.138 Contrary to Kimbrell’s suggestion, conservation easements
are incredibly difficult to extinguish or modify, even with the police
power of eminent domain.139 Thus, a conservation banker who would
prefer to sell her old banking land may very well end up stuck with both
a financially unattractive piece of property containing a conservation
easement and a duty to purchase more credits with money she may not
have. With regard to species that will likely disperse widely over the
coming years, bankers would be left with the duty to purchase many
more acres of conservation easements, leaving a trail of ecologically
beneficial but financially toxic land in the banker’s wake. If the initial
complication of multispecies banks is not enough to prevent would-be
bankers from entering into the market, the “continual purchase” provision
would act as a glaring “DO NOT ENTER” sign to future bankers.
Finally, Kimbrell’s solution could create costly litigation in an
industry that is already cash strapped and sparsely litigated.140 For
example, under Kimbrell’s proposal, bankers might need to sue to:
(1) terminate conservation easements on their old conservation banks;
(2) challenge an FWS decision that the conservation bank’s target species
are moving off of the banking land; or (3) challenge contract terms
requiring bankers to purchase credits in other banks or divest in their
138. Derrick P. Fellows, Note, Kelo, Conservation Easements, and Forever: Why Eminent
Domain Is Not a Sufficient Check on Conservation Easements’ Perpetual Duration, 35 Wm. & Mary
Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 625, 630 (2011) (stating that even eminent domain is an “inadequate remedy to
counteract the otherwise perpetual nature of many conservation easements”).
139. See generally id. (discussing the complex legal issues involved in exercising eminent domain
against conservation easements); see also Dana Joel Gattuso, Conservation Easements: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly, Nat’l Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y Res. (May 2008), http://www.nationalcenter.org/
NPA569.html (“Outcomes [from attempts to terminate conservation easements] could differ depending
on the specific language of the easement, state law, and interpretations of the residing courts. Laws
generally favor honoring perpetuity, primarily because grantors receive federal tax benefits for donating
or selling conservation easements only if they are perpetual.”).
140. Currently, conservation banks are hardly ever the subject of litigation. This could change,
however, if landowners were contractually obligated to either sell land that they did not wish to sell or
buy new land they are unable to afford. These added duties could easily compel bankers to litigate
against FWS to challenge the terms of their banking agreements.
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own banks. This sort of legal conflict would use resources better spent on
species conservation, on both the federal and private sides.

V. Climate Banking
A. Climate Banking as a Viable Alternative to Conservation
Banking
As species move in response to climate change, the static
assumptions on which a reserve-based system, such as conservation
banking, rests will likely fail to adequately conserve species.141 Current
models of species movement implicate a more dynamic approach to
species conservation that assumes species movement in response to the
multifarious pressures of climate change and habitat modification.
Therefore, any new conservation policy that FWS promotes should be
more climate-adaptive. These new climate-adaptive strategies should not
simply seek to conserve species where they currently are; instead, these
new strategies should proactively seek to conserve species as they move.
As FWS indicates in its conservation banking guidelines, it views
market-based conservation incentives as a viable incentive to promote
conservation on private land.142 If FWS chooses to continue to use a
market-based system to conserve listed species, it should do so under a
more climate-adaptive framework. I refer to this new system as “climate
banking.”
Unlike the purely fee simple conservation banking system, climate
banking aims to incorporate species movement into its conservation
strategy. Under a climate-banking system, FWS can continue to use its
current conservation banking credit system to acquire the financial
means to conserve species on private land.143 On the land to be

141. Thompson, supra note 44, at 103 (“To the degree that the habitat of a species is evolving, a
pure reserve strategy also may not be ecologically sustainable in the long run.”).
142. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 1 (“Conservation banking is attractive to landowners
and land managers because it allows conservation to be implemented within a market framework,
where habitat for listed species is treated as a benefit rather than a liability.”).
143. Although there is no unanimous support of the commodification of species habitat, FWS has
signaled that it plans to continue to endorse market-based conservation incentives on private land,
such as conservation banking. Commodification will consistently fail to capture the true value of
species habitat as it is available today and in the future, and this value will be consistently in flux both
in the short and long term. At the very least, a market-based credit system can provide more
conservation resources for moving species than other schemes currently available. Although it is a less
than ideal solution, I propose climate banking under these practical and political constraints. See
Wissel & Wätzold, supra note 105, at 404 (“[T]he application of tradable permits to biodiversity
conservation is a complex issue because destroyed and restored habitats are likely to differ. There may
be various trade-offs between the ecological requirements that destroyed and restored habitats be as
similar as possible, and the need for a certain level of market activity to have a functioning trading
system.”); but cf. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at i (asserting that conservation banking promotes
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developed, climate credits can be calculated as they were before, with a
monetary conservation value attached to them. The developer can
purchase these credits on an open market within the service area of the
bank, as is the current practice.
The main difference between conservation banking and climate
banking is that these credits will not be sold exclusively to fee simple
banks. Instead of promoting the conservation of a purely fee simple
conservation system, “climate credits” will be sold to a “climate
banker”—a private conservation organization that enters into an
agreement with both the developer and FWS to follow the climate bank’s
target species as it moves. Under a climate-banking agreement, the
climate banker’s duty of following the target species will be two-fold: to
monitor species movement and to implement conservation measures
where the target species are found.
The monitoring component of climate banking would serve the
important function of tracking species. This sort of tracking is of
paramount importance since one of the largest “unknowns” of how
species will respond to climate change is where species will move.144 This
sort of species tracking could be undertaken either intrusively, through
the insertion of subdural GPS devices into certain individuals of the
banking species, or unobtrusively, by periodically searching for signs of
species on land, such as the presence of fox dens.145 As the climate
banker monitors and tracks the species, it would have an affirmative duty
to report this information to FWS and to publicize this information,
either through the maintenance of its own website or through FWS’s
maintenance of a nationwide information clearinghouse.146 As the

the purpose of the ESA because it “provides a collaborative incentive-based approach to endangered
species conservation, which . . . can aid in the recovery of the species”).
144. See Kimbrell, supra note 124, at 145 (arguing that a “weakness of [the purchasing future
habitat] approach is that ecological models may not be able to accurately predict where a listed species
will occur in the future to make this approach feasible”).
145. Biologists use both methods to monitor and track study species. So long as the climate
banking company works with the approval of FWS, any “taking” under the ESA should be approved,
and, therefore, incidental to the climate banker’s goal of species conservation. See Robert R. Ream et
al., Population Dynamics and Home Range Changes in a Colonizing Wolf Population, in The Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem: Redefining America’s Wilderness Heritage 349, 352–54 (Robert B.
Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1994) (radio-collar tracking of species movements); Khristen Foss, OR-7
(The Lone Wolf) Continues to Travel, Rocky Mountain Tracking (Dec. 6, 2011) (GPS tracking);
James Hadler et al., West Nile Virus Surveillance in Connecticut in 2000: An Intense Epizootic
Without High Risk for Severe Human Disease, 7 Emerging Infectious Diseases 636, 636 (2001)
(visual tracking). This sort of tracking could easily fall under the ESA section 10 take exception,
allowing “any act . . . for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected
species, including, but not limited to, acts necessary for the establishment and maintenance of
experimental populations.” Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (2014).
146. The information-gathering step is crucial, and it is also often very cost intensive. Conservation
efforts can only actively protect those individuals of a species that can be located. See David T.
Barnett et al., The Art and Science of Weed Mapping, 132 Envtl. Monitoring & Assessment 235, 236
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climate banker collects this information, it can also report any
unauthorized takings of listed species, which could improve the
enforcement function of the ESA.147
Although information gathering is an important step in conserving
species as they move, climate bankers would need to use the majority of
the resources they receive from climate credits to actively conserve the
species where it is found on private land. Habitat restoration and
maintenance activities should focus on holistically accommodating the
target species’ resource needs on private land. Also, climate bankers
could be encouraged to aggressively adopt new proven conservation
strategies as they are developed.148
As listed species move, they will enter different privately held land.
Once a climate bank’s target species moves, the climate banker would
then need to obtain permission to conduct its conservation activities on
those private lands. Climate bankers can obtain this permission through
the ITP process. For example, if a landowner wishes to use portions of
her land already in use by a listed species, she would likely need to
obtain an ITP, which would contain conditions meant to protect the
listed species. One such ITP condition would be to allow the climate
banking company access to relevant portions of the landowner’s land to
conduct its conservation activities. Since the climate banking company
already has an approved conservation strategy, climate banking could
then be used to streamline the incidental take permitting process on
private land. In this scenario, the private landowner may be responsible
for mitigating the adverse effects of her incidental take, but the climate

(2007) (“Mapping[, a form of information gathering,] records what, how much, and where . . . species
exist on a landscape, and, when implemented over time and space . . . helps predict the spread of
species, facilitates the exchange of data between agencies, and increases public and political
awareness.”); see also You Can Be a Scientist, Too!, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/climatestudents/
scientists/citizen-science.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (listing various organizations and projects that
request volunteers to help gather information “by observing the world around [them] and reporting
what [they] find”).
147. This suggestion is tenuous. FWS walks a thin line between promoting conservation and
creating enmity towards it. Deputizing climate bankers as FWS reporters could create deep distrust
between landowners and climate bankers, which could limit climate bankers’ access to target species
and foster general distrust for their work. However, having bankers constantly survey private land for
signs of listed species could also help FWS fulfill its mandate to protect listed species. Although
admirable, I would advise against making climate bankers play an enforcement role, at least until they
have become better established in the field.
148. Other conservation methods have proven to be inflexible and may disincentivize adoption of
new conservation strategies. See Lawsuit Challenges Plan to Log 150,000 Acres in Northern
California,
Center
for
Biological
Diversity
(Aug. 12,
2013),
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/
2013/fruit-growers-supply-08-12-2013.html (discussing a habitat conservation plan containing a fiftyyear contract term where the landowner would only be required to meet mitigation measures agreed
upon at the signing of the document).

Whipps_13 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete)

February 2015]

CLIMATE ADAPTIVE SOLUTIONS

3/21/2015 4:28 PM

583

banker would be responsible for using the assets it has acquired from
credits sold to it to take on the more costly task of conserving the species
on private land.149
At the same time that climate banking companies are conserving
and monitoring species where they are found, climate bankers could
proactively encourage target species to use ecosystem corridors
predetermined to be ecologically suitable paths to larger public lands.150
To achieve this, climate bankers could establish and sell credits to
proactively restore and maintain habitat in these “least-cost” corridors,
with the understanding that there is a high likelihood that target species
will prefer to use, and will tend to fare better, on these paths.151
Currently, conservation banking is primarily conducted by for-profit
organizations that specialize in conservation banking.152 The new climate
banking system could be conducted by these same for-profit
organizations, with a similar or greater degree of auditing and reporting
than these organizations are subject to under the current system.153
Because these organizations specialize in habitat management, FWS
generally considers their work to be of an acceptable quality.154
However, environmentally focused nonprofit organizations and local
agencies would also be able to perform these same duties, possibly with
less doubt that these organizations are “act[ing] in the public interest.”155
Currently, all three types of bankers are encouraged to manage banks
and sell credits. Unless one type of organization (public, private, or
nonprofit) proves to be more effective or trustworthy at managing

149. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 2 (discussing the difference between mitigation and
conservation).
150. See Kristeen Penrod et al., S. Coast Wildlands Project, South Coast Missing Linkages
Project: A Linkage Design for the Tehachapi Connection 9 (2003) (discussing a study mapping a
set of least-cost corridors for several listed species, defined as “the zone in which [all modeled species]
would encounter the least energy expenditure,” which would increase species’ chances of survival).
151. See id. at 8.
152. See Wildlands: The Leader in Mitigation Banking, Wildlands, http://www.wildlandsinc.com/
about/company-overview (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); see also Approved California Banks, supra note
117 (listing all the banking sites in California, categorized by ownership type).
153. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 13, 16–17 (listing reporting and monitoring
requirements required to be placed in the banking agreement). In particular, climate banking could
profit from more explicit and increased auditing requirements. Increased FWS auditing would be
advised especially when climate banking is first introduced to ensure this conservation strategy proves
beneficial to the managed species and to iron out any wrinkles.
154. I found little discussion about the benefits of one organization over another in the
conservation banking context. However, the longer-established and similar mitigation banking
programs have discussed the advantages of each type of bank owner. See, e.g., Compensatory
Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,606 (Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230). In another market-based banking context, that privately owned banks “have
certain advantages. They have a strong financial incentive to provide effective, timely mitigation that
may be lacking for noncommercial entities.” Id.
155. Id.
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climate banks over time, all three should be encouraged to participate in
this new market.156 Since commercial entities are the main participants in
the current banking market, it would seem natural that they would also
be the vanguard of any new banking system.
The inception of a new climate banking incentive system does not
entirely obviate the need for conservation banks or other reserves. Even
if climate banks become the main focus of the market-based private
conservation movement, conservation banks could be used as stints in
the “artery” corridors keeping these least-cost corridors open. Since
these corridors will likely be valuable highways for the movement of
multiple species in the future, conservation banks could be funded and
maintained as a conservation easement in perpetuity. The owners of
these strategically placed conservation banks would be required to assist
the conservation mandate of the climate banker for the duration that the
target species remain on the conservation banker’s land. However, in the
climate-change scenario, the overall goal of the conservation bank would
be to make movement to listed species’ ultimate habitat possible.
As with conservation banking, climate bankers will have to have
some incentive structure to encourage good work. In the current
conservation banking system, private bankers are, at a minimum,
financially motivated to effectively manage their land. They are also
contractually bound to regularly fulfill certain minimum duties, and they
risk losing the ability to sell credits and to manage their banking land if
they fail to meet these requirements.157 FWS may also require the banker
to post a “bond equal to the present value of the management costs . . .
to ensure performance.”158 FWS should continue to use all of these
tactics to ensure private banker performance. For nonprofit and
government actors, the incentive will not only be fear of breach of
contract and other remedial action, but also that that these organizations
are inherently motivated to “act in the public interest.”159 Additionally,
all three types of organizations would suffer reputational losses if they
fail to satisfactorily meet their climate banking obligations. A loss in
reputation may lead to organizational difficulty in fundraising, selling
credits, or getting new bank lands approved for sale.

156. Currently, there is insufficient information to determine whether there should be a preference
for public, private, or nonprofit management of these banks. Unless and until there is a consensus
favoring or disfavoring one organizational type of banker, I propose to allow all three players to
continue to participate in this new market.
157. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 14 (discussing remedial actions in the event the bank
owners fail to meet their obligations).
158. Id.
159. See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,606
(Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230).
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B. Potential Problems with the Climate Banking System
Although climate banking has clear conservation advantages with
regard to managing populations of moving species, the mobility of this
new program may also cause some noteworthy drawbacks. First, despite
the incentives climate banking may offer to landowners, there may still
be resistance to letting strangers onto landowners’ lands for trust and
privacy reasons. For instance, a landowner may be concerned that the
climate banker may report observed malfeasance to FWS, such as
destroyed habitat or injury to protected species, which may cause FWS to
initiate an enforcement action against the landowner. Additionally,
landowners may simply feel uncomfortable with having guests on their
land whom they would not have otherwise invited. If several landowners
in a key corridor refuse access, this refusal could stymie the work of the
climate banker and weaken efforts to conserve the listed target species.
As to landowners’ concerns about being reported for ESA
violations, FWS already attempts to ease landowner fears through
selective enforcement of the ESA and the addition of “no surprises”
clauses in their ITPs.160 With “no surprises” clauses and the broader ITP
structure, FWS guarantees landowners will not be penalized for an
incidental take of species or unforeseen habitat destruction on their
land.161 With regard to landowners’ other privacy concerns, ITP
conditions normally require the landowner to permit FWS access to their
land for auditing and inspection purposes.162 Presented with a choice to
allow a climate banker or a government official onto their land,
landowners may prefer to provide land access to the climate banker.
Finally, any trust issues and privacy concerns will likely diminish as
climate bankers become an established presence and landowners begin to
form relationships with these organizations.

160. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(2)(A)–(F)
(2014) (guaranteeing that FWS will not hold landowners liable for incidental takings of listed species
so long as permittees meet permit conditions for species listed in their ITPs); see also Spirit of the Sage
Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67, 79 (D.D.C. 2003) (FWS asserting that the no surprises rule is
simply a codification of their preexisting authority to selectively enforce the ESA).
161. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Habitat Conservation Plans: Section 10 of the Endangered
Species Act 1 (2005), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCP_Incidental_Take.pdf.
FWS only guarantees protection from enforcement in response to unintentional harm. Nothing in any
future regulatory scheme will likely reward landowners who intentionally harm a listed species.
Therefore, any guarantee the “no surprises” policy and ITPs provide to landowners will likely be
limited to unintentional harm only. Landowners who intentionally harm species may still expose
themselves to being reported to FWS by climate bankers.
162. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Fish & Wildlife Serv. et al., Habitat Conservation Planning
and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook app. 4 at 5 (1996), available at
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/Hcpapp4.pdf (permit template listing as one of FWS’s
responsibilities as “monitor[ing] the implementation [of the Permit] including each of the terms of [the
Implementing] Agreement . . . in order to ensure compliance with the Permit”).
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FWS also has the option to employ more forceful methods to ensure
landowner cooperation. Most importantly, landowners who wish to
continue to use land that is a listed species’ habitat need to have a valid
ITP in order to do so. FWS could grant permits only on the condition
that if a species is the target of a climate bank, the climate banker will be
allowed to conduct its conservation activities on relevant portions of the
landowner’s land. Since climate banking may reduce the total cost of the
landowner’s ITP performance, it is reasonable to imagine that many
landowners would welcome the addition of this term. If FWS chooses to
allow some landowners to exclude climate bankers from their lands,
FWS could either require the recalcitrant landowner to purchase extra
climate bank credits to offset their incidental take, or FWS could transfer
the extra cost of conservation that would have been covered by the
climate banker onto the private landowner in the form of stricter on-site
ITP conditions. In situations where landowners take on the climate
banker’s conservation duties, climate bankers may still play an important
advisory role by instructing the landowner on how to effectively perform
her new duties.
Second, following species that are dispersing in several directions
may become very costly for climate bankers, or some habitat
modifications may be relatively expensive to undertake. Since climate
banking would be a voluntary market, the risk of costs outrunning profits
would likely be the main reason climate bankers would not enter into
this market.
There are several ways in which climate bankers could mitigate
these costs. First, FWS could limit climate bankers’ duties until their
bank has a certain minimum amount of credits purchased. For instance,
climate bankers may only be initially required to maintain a limited
portion of the target species’ service area at first, which would then grow
as the banker’s bank becomes better established. If populations of a
species start to split into distinct segments, a climate banker who does
not have the resources to conserve all populations could also apply to
FWS to only conserve certain populations. Next, if the climate banker
reports to FWS that a target species is expensive to conserve, FWS could
internalize this cost by raising the cost of climate credits to developers.
Alternatively, FWS could provide funding to climate bankers to control
excessive costs.
Despite these potentially unforeseeable costs, climate banking may
prove to be a more cost-effective solution than conservation banking.
Unlike conservation banking, climate banking would not require bankers
to conserve land in fee simple. Thus, although climate bankers may need
to be more mobile than conservation bankers, climate bankers would
feasibly be able to function at a fraction of the cost of conservation
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banking.163 As with conservation banking, climate bankers must pay to
improve and maintain climate banking land. Because climate bankers
may continually move with the species, the cost of habitat improvement
and maintenance would potentially be greater than that of the
conservation bankers, who would likely be required to improve their
banking land less often. This increased cost should be offset by the
climate bankers’ avoidance of land purchase and annual land taxes.
Additionally, climate bankers may be able to substantially reduce the
cost of land improvement by proactively improving least-cost corridors
for use by multiple climate banking species.164

Conclusion
The best scientific information we have indicates humans are the
major cause of global climate change. Humans are responsible for a
greatly magnified rate of species extinction. Many believe that
conserving species is simply the right thing to do. However, even the less
environmentally motivated members of our species can recognize the
immense economic and informational benefit other nonhuman species
have. Each lost species signals the permanent loss of millennia of
information and future value. In the end, each lost species is a lost
opportunity.
Although some species, such as humans and cockroaches, are better
equipped to acclimate to a variety of ecosystems, a vast majority of
species are not so lucky. To these species, a changing climate means
changed habitat. When crucial features of species habitat move, change,
or disappear, most species are strained to react. Without active human
efforts, thousands to millions of species may go extinct.
Conservation banking has been heralded as one of the most positive
environmental compromises to come out of the ESA. With policies such
as this, landowners may no longer view endangered and threatened
species on their land as an obstruction to financial gain. Banking shows
how conservation can be both financially and ecologically beneficial.
However, the theory behind conservation banking fails to account
for species movement. Conservation banks, like the wildlife reserve

163. Conservation banking combines the costs of fee simple ownership and species conservation in
perpetuity. Of the two up-front costs, the fee simple ownership would normally be the more expensive
by several orders. However, the continuing cost of conservation in perpetuity, by its very nature,
would eventually outstrip the cost of the fee simple purchase of even very expensive land. Since
climate banking potentially envisions protecting species over much broader and more dynamic ranges
and may incur extra costs in the form of habitat restoration as species move, I would suggest that FWS
employ some of the cost-reducing mechanisms I discuss in this Part. That is, if conservation costs
expand beyond revenue brought in through the sale of climate credits.
164. See Penrod et al., supra note 150, at 8 (discussing the benefits of maintaining “least-cost”
corridors—corridors of improved habitat that species could use to migrate in response to climate change).
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system, may have been seen as an ideal system to protect species in an
earlier era. However, this system fundamentally fails to account for one
of the most dynamic forces in human history: climate change.
Conservation banks cannot be the full solution to species protection.
In the future, conservation policies must focus on protecting species
where they are, not just where policymakers would like them to be. In
order for future conservation policies to be effective, policymakers must
build climate-adaptive measures into current laws and regulations. If we
are to use a market-based approach that takes climate change into
account, this system will have to be an adaptive one. Climate banking has
the ability to better conserve listed species as they move, and it would do
so without substantially disrupting the current market system that FWS
promotes through its conservation banking policy. It is through the
promotion of policies such as climate banking that FWS will be better
able to conserve listed species on the move as a result of climate change.
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